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ARBITRARY AND GODLIKE DETERMINATIONS:




In 1979, Montana broke from the rest of the nation and adopted a
novel approach to dealing with the mentally ill who commit crimes: abol-
ishing the insanity defense. The Montana Legislature discarded the insanity
defense primarily out of concern about the unscientific nature of the mental
health field and the resulting potential for its abuse as a defense.1 The spon-
sor of the abolition legislation asserted that psychiatry was “unscientific,”
psychiatrists made “arbitrary and godlike determinations,” and psychiatrists
and social workers needed to be “removed” from the criminal justice sys-
tem.2
Even though insanity was raised in less than one percent of all criminal
trials,3 Montana embraced the notion that—from the perspective of society
and crime victims—people with mental illness who commit crimes are
criminals first and mentally ill second.4 After abolition, mental illness was
no longer relevant as to whether the defendant was insane at the time of the
crime; instead, mental illness became only relevant as to whether the defen-
dant satisfied the elements of the crime charged.5 In doing so, the Montana
Legislature eliminated insanity as an affirmative defense, but made a defen-
dant’s mental illness potentially relevant to every criminal offense with a
mental state element.
The bald reality of abolishing the insanity defense is that people who
are insane—and were insane at the time of the offense—are convicted of
crimes and treated like criminals. For this reason, the morality of Montana’s
approach has been questioned. Is it appropriate to punish someone who, due
* Professor, The University of Montana School of Law; B.A., Brown University, 1988; J.D.,
Washington University in St. Louis, 1993. Thanks as always to Kristin King-Ries for her support. And
many thanks to Professor Maria Isabella Gonzalez Tapia, School of Law, University of Cordoba, Spain.
Her engaging discussions on insanity and neuroscience were invaluable.
1. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., Hearing on H.B. 877, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 12 (Feb. 20, 1979).
2. Id. Jeanne Matthews Bender, Student Author, After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity
Defense in Montana, 45 Mont. L. Rev. 133, 137 n. 30 (1984).
3. Daniel J. Nusbaum, Student Author, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of
the Constitutional Implications of “Abolishing” the Insanity Defense, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1509, 1562
(2002).
4. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12.
5. Stephanie C. Stimpson, Student Author, State v. Cowan: The Consequences of Montana’s Abo-
lition of the Insanity Defense, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 503, 510 (1994).
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to mental illness, could not exercise moral choices to engage in, or avoid,
criminal conduct?6 Underlying this discussion is the question of whether the
criminal law is justified as a response to a defendant’s exercise of free will
or if it is essentially an exercise in social control.
In the past 35 years, despite these concerns, the Montana Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of Montana’s approach.7
In addition, while the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule directly
on the constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defense, the Supreme
Court has essentially found no constitutional restrictions on state legisla-
tures in how they configure their approach to criminal treatment of the men-
tally ill.8 For the past 35 years,  Montana has been at the forefront of a
reconsideration of and restriction on the use of mental illness and defect as
a defense in the criminal justice system.
That same 35 year period, however, has seen an explosion in the field
of neuroscience—the study of the brain and the nervous system—largely as
a result of new computer imaging techniques that allow study of the brain in
action.9 In the past decade alone, neuroscience has discovered important
correlations between brain abnormalities and criminal behavior.10 Develop-
ments in neuroscience—and insights into causality of criminality—will
likely continue to develop at an exponential rate due to international invest-
ment and collaboration. For example, President Obama recently announced
the formation of the BRAIN Initiative (Brain Research through Advancing
Innovative Neurotechnologies).11 Similar to the Human Genome Project,
the initiative’s goal is to map the activity of every neuron in the human
brain.12
6. Michael Corrado, The Case for a Purely Volitional Insanity Defense, 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 481,
494 (2009).
7. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 997–998 (Mont. 1984).
8. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 n. 20 (2006) (“We have never held that the Constitution
mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that the Constitution does not so require. This case does
not call upon us to decide the matter.”).
9. The White House, The BRAIN Initiative: Brain Research through Advancing Innovative
Neurotechnologies, http://perma.cc/ZS5Y-9NQC (http://www.whitehouse.gov/BRAIN) (accessed Jan.
31, 2015).
10. Andrea L. Glenn & Adrian Raine, Neurocriminology: Implications for the Punishment, Predic-
tion and Prevention of Criminal Behaviour, 15 Nat. Revs. Neuroscience 54, 54 (2014).
11. The White House, supra n. 9.
12. Id.; see also Nat’l Insts. of Health, The BRAIN Initiative: Brain Research through Advancing
Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN), http://perma.cc/4RXA-TRPE (http://braininitiative.nih.gov) (ac-
cessed Jan. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Brain Initiative Report] (“By accelerating the development and appli-
cation of innovative technologies, researchers will be able to produce a revolutionary new dynamic
picture of the brain that, for the first time, shows how individual cells and complex neural circuits
interact in both time and space. Long desired by researchers seeking new ways to treat, cure, and even
prevent brain disorders, this picture will fill major gaps in our current knowledge and provide unprece-
dented opportunities for exploring exactly how the brain enables the human body to record, process,
utilize, store, and retrieve vast quantities of information, all at the speed of thought.”).
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Significantly, neuroscientific insights into criminality are returning
questions about criminal treatment of the mentally ill to the fore.13 These
questions will likely become more difficult as neuroscience produces
greater specificity and moves from correlation to causation. Neuroscience
developments have the potential to challenge notions of criminality as inde-
pendent choice and to force explicit recognition of the social control aspects
of the criminal law. Nowhere is this more likely to occur than in Montana.
Due to the legislature’s abolition of the insanity defense, mental disease or
defect is now relevant to every criminal offense that requires a mental state.
In other words, in an effort to remove the unscientific, arbitrary, and god-
like determinations of psychiatrists from the criminal justice system, the
Montana Legislature has opened the door to neuroscience evidence that is
far more scientific and compelling, and therefore has a greater capacity to
confound jurors. In addition, the legislature’s effort to prevent the use of
insanity as a defense in a tiny fraction of cases has made neuroscience evi-
dence potentially admissible in nearly every criminal trial.
II. THE 1979 ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN MONTANA
In 1979, Montana became the first state in the country to abolish the
insanity defense.14 Obviously, coming two years before John Hinckley was
found not guilty by reason of insanity for shooting President Reagan, the
Hinckley acquittal was not an influence on the Montana Legislature. Nor
does it appear that the Legislature reacted to a high-profile insanity acquittal
in Montana. Rather, the Legislature seems to have been influenced by
events outside of Montana and primarily motivated by concern over the
misuse of psychology in general.15 As a result, the Montana Legislature
adopted a radical new approach to insanity that cloaked social control inter-
ests in assertions of free will.
In the 1979 session, the Legislature considered two bills relating to the
insanity defense. House Bill 877, sponsored by freshman Republican Rep-
resentative Michael Keedy, proposed to abolish the defense of insanity.16
Senate Bill 495, sponsored by Democratic Senator Thomas Towe, sought to
add to the insanity defense alternative sentencing options for persons suffer-
ing from a mental disease or defect.17 After Senator Towe’s bill was tabled
13. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 L. & Inequal. 511 (2013); Stephen J. Morse,
Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 Neuroethics 205 (2008); Laura Reider, Student Author,
Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral
and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 289 (1998).
14. Henry J. Steadman et al., Maintenance of an Insanity Defense under Montana’s “Abolition” of
the Insanity Defense, 146 Am. J. Psych. 357, 357 (1989).
15. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12.
16. Id.
17. Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., Minutes of Meeting, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 4 (Mar. 21, 1979).
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in the House, the Senate Judiciary Committee—of which Senator Towe was
a member—agreed to work on House Bill 877, and amended it to add alter-
native sentencing for persons with mental disease or defect.18 As a result of
that compromise, the final legislation abolished the insanity defense and
only allowed evidence of a mental disease or defect to be admissible at trial
for the purpose of determining whether the defendant had the mental state
for the charged offense.
During the consideration of House Bill 877, there was no mention of
any specific criminal case in the testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or the notes from the Free
Joint Conference Committee.19 Rather, the concern largely seemed to be
over the abuse of the system and the unreliability of expert testimony.
House Bill 877’s sponsor, Representative Keedy, testified before the House
Judiciary Committee and expressed strong opposition to psychiatric testi-
mony.20 Keedy seemed particularly concerned about the broad and unre-
strained influence of psychiatrists in criminal trials. Keedy stated that psy-
chiatrists make “arbitrary and godlike determinations” or “godly and outra-
geous” statements.21 He asserted that his bill would remove “psychiatrists
and social workers” from the criminal justice system.22 Instead of highlight-
ing the failings in a particular prosecution or providing examples of crimi-
nal cases in which psychiatric expert testimony resulted in a miscarriage of
justice, Representative Keedy made what seems to be a disconnected and
irrelevant comment about Senator Goldwater. In his testimony, Representa-
tive Keedy stated, “In 1974 Goldwater was declared paranoid and schizo-
phrenic by psychiatrists.”23
Representative Keedy’s comment about Goldwater’s diagnosis of
paranoia and schizophrenia referenced what has been called “not American
psychiatry’s finest hour.”24 In 1964, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater
of Arizona was running for president against the incumbent, President Lyn-
don B. Johnson.25 In a bitter and divisive primary campaign, Goldwater
narrowly defeated the more moderate New York Governor Nelson Rocke-
18. Id.
19. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12; see also Bender, supra n. 2, at 137.
20. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12.
21. Id. (“godly and outrageous”); Bender, supra n. 2, at 137 n. 30 (“arbitrary and God-like determi-
nations”).
22. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12.
23. Id.
24. Richard A. Friedman, How a Telescopic Lens Muddles Psychiatric Insights, N.Y. Times, D5
(May 24, 2011) (available at http://perma.cc/636N-2358 (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/health/
views/24mind.html)).
25. Wikipedia, Barry Goldwater, http://perma.cc/3CDZ-R3EC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barry_
Goldwater) (last modified Mar. 31, 2015, 00:23).
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feller for the Republican nomination.26 The national election was as contro-
versial and vitriolic. Goldwater was derided by Democrats and attacked by
liberal Republicans as being “a demagogue and a leader of right-wing ex-
tremists and racists who was likely to lead the United States into nuclear
war, eliminate civil rights progress, and destroy such social welfare pro-
grams as Social Security.”27
Shortly before the general election, Fact Magazine released a special
election issue entitled: “The Unconscious of a Conservative: A Special Is-
sue on the Mind of Barry Goldwater.”28 The magazine published the results
of a survey it sent to members of the American Psychiatric Association
asking their professional assessment of Goldwater. The survey consisted of
one question: “Do you believe Barry Goldwater is psychologically fit to
serve as President of the United States? ( ) No ( ) Yes.”29 Accompanying
the survey was a letter, which stated:
We would appreciate, first, your indicating whether you think Goldwater is
stable enough to serve as President by checking the appropriate box on the
enclosed sheet of paper. We would also appreciate any remarks you might
care to make concerning Goldwater’s general mental stability, insofar as you
are able to draw inferences concerning it from his public utterances, his politi-
cal viewpoints, and whatever knowledge you may have of his personality and
background. Does he seem prone to aggressive behavior and destructiveness?
Does he seem callous to the downtrodden and needy? Can you offer any ex-
planation of his public temper-tantrums and his occasional outbursts of pro-
fanity? Finally, do you think that his having had two nervous breakdowns has
any bearing on his fitness to govern this country?30
While 12,356 psychiatrists were sent the survey, only 2,417 responded.31
Of the more than 2,000 responses, half of them found Goldwater psycho-
logically unfit to be president, nearly twice as many as found him mentally
fit. The magazine blasted its findings on the cover: “FACT: 1,189 Psychia-
trists say Goldwater is Psychologically Unfit to be President!”32
Given client confidentiality, likely none of the psychiatrists had ever
examined Senator Goldwater. Amazingly, however, only 23% of the re-




28. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1969); Wikipedia, supra n. 25.
29. Goldwater, 414 F.2d at 329.
30. Id. at 330. During the libel trial, evidence was presented that Senator Goldwater had never
experienced any mental illness or “nervous breakdowns.” Mrs. Goldwater testified that she had used the
term “nervous breakdown” in reference to a period of exhaustion due to overwork that her husband had
experienced early in their marriage. There was also evidence presented that the publisher of Fact Maga-
zine was aware of this information prior to publication. Id. at 333 n. 14.
31. There was serious question about the scientific validity of the survey and publication of the
results. Id. at 334.
32. Friedman, supra n. 24.
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sponding psychiatrists stated that they did not have enough information to
make a psychological assessment.33 Instead, psychiatrists asserted that Sen-
ator Goldwater was a “megalomaniac,” “paranoid,” and “grossly
psychotic.”34 Several psychiatrists diagnosed Senator Goldwater as being
schizophrenic and suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder.35 One
response asserted that Goldwater was “inwardly a frightened person who
sees himself as weak and threatened by strong virile power around him,”
and “his call for aggressiveness and the need for individual strength and
prerogatives is an attempt to defend himself against and to deny his feelings
of weakness.”36
Senator Goldwater lost the election in a landslide, carrying only six
states (Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Caro-
lina) and winning only 38% of the popular vote.37 In September of 1965,
ten months after the election, Goldwater brought a federal libel suit against
Fact Magazine, its publisher, and editor.38 Goldwater asserted that the issue
was false and published with either actual malice or with reckless disregard
for the truth and alleged $1 million in actual and $1 million in punitive
damages.39 The jury found for Goldwater and awarded him $1 in compen-
satory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.40 In 1969, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the verdict.41 In
1973, the American Psychiatric Association issued the “Goldwater rule,”
which prohibits psychiatrists from commenting on people they have not
personally examined.42
33. Many psychiatrists complained to the American Psychiatric Association about the survey. The
American Psychiatric Association sent the following letter to the publishers of Fact Magazine:
Many members of this association have, with justifiable indignation, called our attention
to a questionnaire you have sent them asking whether they “think Barry Goldwater psycholog-
ically fit to serve as President of the United States.”
A physician renders an opinion on the psychological fitness or mental condition of any-
one in the traditional (and confidential) doctor-patient relationship in which findings are based
upon a thorough clinical examination.
Being aware of this, should you decide to publish the results of a purported “survey” of
psychiatric opinion on the question you have posed, this Association will take all possible
measures to disavow its validity.
Goldwater, 414 F.2d at 334.
34. Friedman, supra n. 24.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Barnes, supra n. 26; Wikipedia, supra n. 25. R
38. Goldwater, 414 F.2d at 335.
39. Id. at 327.
40. Id. at 328.
41. Id. at 344.
42. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association drafted Section 7.3 of The Principles of Medical
Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, which became known as the Goldwater
Rule:
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The Goldwater libel trial took place while Representative Keedy was a
law student at Washington University in St. Louis. The trial was widely
publicized and appears to have had a large effect on Representative Keedy,
which is understandable given the outrageousness of the “psychiatric” as-
sessments. There is also a suggestion that Keedy’s views on psychiatry and
the insanity defense were influenced by another event that took place
shortly after the Goldwater trial.43 In 1974, Professor Szasz, a psychiatrist,
wrote a book entitled, “The Myth of Mental Illness” in which he called for
the abolition of the insanity defense. According to Szasz:
Mental illness is a myth. Psychiatrists are not concerned with mental illnesses
and their treatments. In actual practice they deal with personal, social, and
ethical problems in living.
I have argued that, today, the notion of a person “having a mental ill-
ness” is scientifically crippling. It provides professional assent to a popular
rationalization—namely, that problems in living experienced and expressed in
terms of so-called psychiatric symptoms are basically similar to bodily dis-
eases. Moreover, the concept of mental illness also undermines the principle
of personal responsibility, the ground on which all free political institutions
rest. For the individual, the notion of mental illness precludes an inquiring
attitude toward his conflicts which his “symptoms” at once conceal and re-
veal. For a society, it precludes regarding individuals as responsible persons
and invites, instead, treating them as irresponsible patients.44
The influence of both Goldwater and Szasz is reflected in Keedy’s
position toward mental health professionals and his assessment that people
with mental illness should be held accountable. These sentiments are re-
flected in Representative Keedy’s testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee:
Psychiatrists and social workers should be removed from the criminal justice
process. Psychiatric determinations are not scientifically verifiable. In 1974
Goldwater was declared paranoid and schizophrenic by psychiatrists. I think
if a defendant is charged and acquitted on the ground of mental disease or
defect he could not have a particular state of mind that is an essential element
On occasion psychiatrists are asked for an opinion about an individual who is in the light of
public attention or who has disclosed information about himself/herself through public media.
In such circumstances, a psychiatrist may share with the public his or her expertise about
psychiatric issues in general. However, it is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional
opinion unless he or she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authoriza-
tion for such a statement.
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to
Psychiatry 9 (2013) (available at http://perma.cc/P4ZL-W7S4 (http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/eth-
ics/resources-standards)).
43. Bender, supra n. 2, at 137 n. 30 (citing Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., Testimony Concerning the R
Insanity Defense, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2–3 (1982) (statement of John H. Maynard, Assistant Attorney
General, Montana)).
44. Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness 262 (rev. ed., Harper & Row 1974); see also
Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 Emory L.J. 9, 38–39
(1982).
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of the offense charged, the verdict and the judgment shall so state. I think they
are criminals and should be charged as such in our courts. . . . I believe that
criminal law should presume that each of us is capable of free choice of be-
havior. It must be passed upon the offense rather than the offender. My pur-
pose with the bill is to hold people accountable for their criminal acts.45
Representative Keedy considers one of the high points of his career
“having sponsored and carried legislation making Montana the first state in
the country to abolish the ‘insanity defense’ in criminal cases.”46 In an in-
terview with researchers years later, Representative Keedy stated that he
was motivated to change the law regarding insanity for three reasons. First,
he considered a separate defense of insanity unnecessary because “the req-
uisite state of mind is an essential element of the State’s case.”47 Second,
Keedy wanted to address the public’s negative perception of the insanity
defense. Finally, Keedy stated that “psychiatric testimony deflects attention
from the real issues of culpability.”48
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES
Currently, there is near-universal acceptance of an insanity defense in
the United States. All federal courts and 46 of 50 states recognize that cer-
tain mentally ill defendants may not be held criminally responsible for their
conduct.49 Within all of these jurisdictions, mental illness constitutes a de-
fense when the mental illness negates the defendant’s cognition of his or
her conduct, which occurs when he or she is unable to appreciate the nature
of his or her conduct or understand that it is wrong.50 This is generally
referred to as the “cognition test” and is derived from the famous 1843
M’Naghten case in England.51
Daniel M’Naghten, a Scottish woodworker, was apparently convinced
that there was a political plot to kill him and that the plot was headed by the
British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel.52 M’Naghten sought to frustrate the
conspiracy by killing Peel. On January 20, 1843, M’Naghten approached
45. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12. R
46. Henning, Keedy & Lee, P.L.L.C., Michael H. Keedy, http://perma.cc/3MMB-5YCZ (http://
www.henning-keedy.com/montana-attorneys/michael-h-keedy/bio/) (accessed Mar. 11, 2015).
47. Steadman et al., supra n. 14, at 358. R
48. Id.
49. Corrado, supra n. 6, at 490–492. R
50. Id. at 490–491; Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law, § 7.2, 397–408 (5th ed., West 2010).
51. LaFave, supra n. 50, at § 7.2, 397–399; Wikipedia, Daniel M’Naghten, http://perma.cc/DMT5- R
PV8C (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_M%27Naghten) (last modified Oct. 6, 2014, 12:51) [herein-
after M’Naghten].
52. LaFave, supra n. 50, at § 7.2, 397; M’Naghten, supra n. 51. Some recent scholarship suggests R
that M’Naghten was involved in a political conspiracy to kill Sir Robert Peel and that he feigned in-
sanity at his trial. See Richard Moran, McNaughtan, Daniel (1802/3–1865), Oxford Dictionary of Na-
tional Biography (Jan. 2008 online ed., Oxford U. Press 2004).
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the Prime Minister’s residence on Downing Street and shot Edward Drum-
mond, apparently under the mistaken belief that Drummond was Peel.53
Drummond, Peel’s private secretary, died five days later. M’Naghten was
apprehended at the scene and brought to trial for murder. At trial,
M’Naghten raised the defense of insanity, and asserted that he was delu-
sional and suffered from a “breakdown of moral sense and a loss of self-
control.”54 The jury found M’Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity.
M’Naghten was committed to a mental hospital, where he died 22 years
later.55
In response to the negative public reaction to the verdict, the appellate
court clarified the law relating to the defense of insanity. This statement of
the law became known as the M’Naghten Rule and remains the
predominate test for legal insanity in the United States: “to establish a de-
fense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.”56 Today, the M’Naghten Rule is the majority
rule for the insanity defense in the United States.57 In 28 states and the
federal courts, M’Naghten is the only rule that allows an insanity defense.58
Around 18 other states recognize the M’Naghten Rule in addition to other
insanity tests.59 Therefore, the M’Naghten Rule is accepted in 46 of 50
states and all federal courts.60
Of the states in the United States that follow the M’Naghten Rule, 16
extend the insanity defense to include a volitional aspect. In these states,
defendants cannot be held criminally responsible if their mental illness un-
dermines their ability to understand the difference between right and wrong
(cognitive defect) or if their mental illness causes an inability to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the law (volitional defect). Although
some states had recognized a defense of insanity based on either a cognitive
defect or a volitional defect prior to the 1960s, the Model Penal Code’s
codification of the cognition and volition tests led to much greater accept-
ance of these tests:
53. LaFave, supra n. 50, at § 7.2, 397; M’Naghten, supra n. 51. R
54. M’Naghten, supra n. 51. R
55. Id.
56. LaFave, supra n. 50, at § 7.2, 398; M’Naghten, supra n. 51. R
57. LaFave, supra n. 50, at § 7.2, 398. R
58. Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1940, 1955–1956 (2010).
59. Id. at 1955; State v. Jensen, 251 N.W.2d 182, 186–187 (N.D. 1977).
60. LaFave, supra n. 50, at § 7.2, 398–399. R
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(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.61
In the 20 years after the Model Penal Code was proposed by the American
Law Institute, the Model Penal Code’s version of the insanity defense was
adopted in all federal courts and a majority of states.62
Extension of the insanity defense—and wide scale recognition of the
volitional defect extension of the M’Naghten Rule—came to a sudden and
dramatic end with the shots fired in front of the Washington Hilton Hotel in
Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C., on March 30, 1981.63 On that date, John
Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Reagan.64 Hinckley was moti-
vated by his infatuation with actress Jodi Foster and tried to impress her by
shooting President Reagan.65 At his trial, Hinckley asserted that he was
insane at the time of the shooting, based primarily on his volitional defect
of an alleged inability to conform his behavior to the law. As Washington,
D.C., is a federal jurisdiction, the jury was instructed on the law of insanity
using the Model Penal Code approach, although with the burden of proof on
the prosecution to prove that Hinckley was not insane at the time of the
shooting.66 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
and Hinckley was committed to a mental institution.67 Hinckley remains
under the care and custody of the mental institution, although he has re-
cently been granted longer home visits.68
Following the 1982 acquittal of John Hinkley, Congress and many
state legislatures jettisoned the volitional defect prong and returned to a
pure M’Naghten Rule approach.69 In 1984, Congress passed the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984, which reads:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that, at
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant
as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
61. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (ALI 1985); Corrado, supra n. 6, at 491. R
62. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The Criminal Responsibility of War
Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 85 Ind. L.J. 87, 110
n. 141 (2010) (citing Richard J. Bonnie, John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Peter W. Low, A Case Study in the
Insanity Defense: The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. 18 (3d ed., Found. Press 2008)).
63. Melinda Carrido, Student Author, Revisiting the Insanity Defense: A Case for Resurrecting the
Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense in Light of Neuroscientific Advances, 41 Sw. L. Rev. 309, 319
(2012).
64. Wikipedia, John Hinckley, Jr., http://perma.cc/K5NK-97HR (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John
_Hinckley,_Jr.) (last modified Mar. 30, 2015, 20:20).
65. Carrido, supra n. 63, at 317. R
66. Id. at 318.
67. Id. at 318–319.
68. Id. at 319.
69. Id.
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nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect
does not otherwise constitute a defense.70
The act changed the law of insanity in three ways. First, the law eliminated
the volition test recognized by the Model Penal Code. Essentially, the In-
sanity Defense Reform Act is a restatement of the M’Naghten Rule.71 Sec-
ond, the law placed the burden of proving insanity on the defense.72 Third,
the law restricted experts from testifying about the ultimate issue of the
accused’s sanity.73
State legislatures also reacted strongly to the Hinckley trial with re-
forms of the insanity defense that made the defense more difficult for de-
fendants.74 Many states reversed course and restricted the insanity defense
to a purely cognition test.75
Currently, only four states reject the notion that mental illness excuses
criminal responsibility: Montana, Utah, Kansas, and Idaho.76 In these states,
evidence of mental illness does not constitute a defense to any crime and
evidence of the defendant’s mental illness is only admissible for the pur-
pose of determining the defendant’s ability to form the required mental state
in the charged statute. Significantly, in these states, the issue at trial is not
whether the defendant has or does not have a mental illness. Rather, the
issue at trial is whether—even if the defendant has a mental illness—the
State has proven that the defendant acted with the appropriate mental
state.77 While most of these states abolished the insanity defense in re-
sponse to the Hinckley assassination attempt, only one had abolished the
insanity defense prior to the Hinckley trial: Montana.78
70. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
71. Carrido, supra n. 63, at 320. R
72. U.S. v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming constitutionality of the In-
sanity Defense Reform Act).
73. Id.
74. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leo´n, “Literature as Law”: The History of the Insanity Plea and a Fic-
tional Application within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 381, 402 (1999) (“On the
whole, 80% of the reform measures undertaken by states during the period of 1978 to 1990 occurred
after the Hinckley acquittal; most of these reforms made ‘the insanity defense a less attractive option for
the defendant.’ As of 1990, 26 (25 states plus the District of Columbia) jurisdictions had adopted some
form of the restrictive M’Naghten test; 13 of these jurisdictions reformed their statute during that period
(ten jurisdictions implemented their amendments post- Hinckley). Additionally, by 1990, 20 states had
implemented the ALI test; and 12 states allowed the guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”) verdict option.”).
75. Id.
76. Corrado, supra n. 6, at 493 n. 88.
77. Id. at 493.
78. Idaho abolished its insanity defense during the 1982 legislative session in response to the
Hinckley assassination attempt in 1981. See Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity Defense:
What Are We Trying to Prove? 31 Idaho L. Rev. 151, 153–156 (1994); Steadman et al., supra n. 14, at R
357.
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IV. MONTANA’S APPROACH PRIOR TO 1979
Prior to abolition of the insanity defense in 1979, Montana had recog-
nized an insanity defense for nearly 100 years.79 In the 1899 case of State v.
Peel,80 the Montana Supreme Court addressed the insanity defense and af-
firmed a defense for the inability, due to mental illness, to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong.81 In addition to the M’Naghten Rule’s cognition
test, the Court also addressed the appropriateness of the volition test for the
first time. Finding the volitional test to be “the more humane doctrine, and
in accord with the more advanced state of medical science and judicial rea-
son,” the Court explicitly adopted a lack of volition as a defense.82 The
Court stated:
[C]riminal responsibility is to be determined solely by the capacity of the
defendant to conceive and entertain the intent to commit the particular crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. In the formation of this intent there
must concur knowledge or intellectual comprehension, and the power of
choice. An absence of the former necessarily implies the want of the latter, for
the latter cannot, in reason, exist without it. On the other hand, the former, as
a scientific fact, may exist, in some degree at least, without the latter. It there-
fore follows that one may have mental capacity and intelligence sufficient to
distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the particular act, and
to understand the consequence of its commission, and yet be so far deprived
of volition and self-control by the overwhelming violence of mental disease
that he is not capable of voluntary action, and therefore not able to choose the
right and avoid the wrong.83
The Montana Supreme Court’s adoption of the insanity defense and the
volitional extension of the M’Naghten Rule were codified by the Montana
Legislature in 1967 and largely followed the Model Penal Code draft.84 The
Montana Legislature’s codification of the insanity defense read:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he is unable either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.
(2) As used in this chapter, the term “mental disease or defect” does not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other antisocial
conduct.85
According to the 1967 Commission comment to the codification:
79. Bender, supra n. 2, at 136.
80. State v. Peel, 59 P. 169 (Mont. 1899).
81. Id. at 173–174.
82. Id. at 173.
83. Id.
84. Stimpson, supra n. 5, at 509–510; Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 95–501 (1969) (The comments to R
Rev. Codes Mont. § 95-501 identify the source for the legislation as the Model Penal Code § 4.01).
85. Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 95–501.
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This section is intended to expand the application of the existing Montana law
to include any psychical abnormalities or subnormalities such as emotional
deficiencies that have reached the dimension that they can be termed mental
diseases or defects and not otherwise. While the section will expand the appli-
cation of the existing Montana law in this respect, actually it does not depart
from the language or test laid down in State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, “Unable to
appreciate the nature or the consequences of his action or so far deprived of
volition by the overwhelming violence of mental disease that he is unable to
choose the right and avoid the wrong.”86
This codification of nearly 100 years of case law would only last 12 years.
V. HOW THE MONTANA ABOLITION WORKS
To assert that Montana has abolished the insanity defense may be
overstating the case.87 The question of whether a criminal defendant suffers
from a mental disease or defect is still relevant and psychiatric testimony is
still critical and central. What abolition did was change the timing of when
mental illness is considered, change who determines whether a defendant
has a mental illness, and attempt to equate trials of mentally ill people with
trials of people not suffering from mental illness. Before abolition, insanity
was the issue at trial. Today, insanity is no longer considered a defense in
the guilt portion of a criminal proceeding.
In removing insanity as a defense during the guilt portion of a trial, the
Montana Legislature determined that mental disease or defect would instead
be considered at three different points in a criminal proceeding: pretrial,
trial, and sentencing.88 In the pretrial phase, the issue is one of capacity.89
Essentially, the questions are whether, due to a mental illness, the defendant
can understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own defense.90 A
finding of incapacity precludes the defendant from being tried, convicted,
or sentenced.91
During trial, evidence of the defendant’s mental disease or defect is
admissible but only as to whether the defendant had the correct state of
mind for the charged offense.92 Essentially, the question at trial is whether
86. Id. at § 95–501 cmt. (quoting Peel, 59 P. at 173) (Note: the correct quote from Peel reads: “It
therefore follows that one may have mental capacity and intelligence sufficient to distinguish between
right and wrong with reference to the particular act, and to understand the consequence of its commis-
sion, and yet be so far deprived of volition and self control by the overwhelming violence of mental
disease that he is not capable of voluntary action, and therefore not able to choose the right and avoid
the wrong.” Id. (emphasis added to show text the Commission comment omitted)).
87. See Steadman et al., supra n. 14. R
88. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996.
89. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–221 (2013).
90. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–103.
91. Id.
92. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–102.
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the defendant acted purposely or knowingly at the time of the offense. As
the Montana Supreme Court stated in State v. Korell, “The State retains the
burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant may, of course, present evidence to contradict the State’s
proof that he committed the offense and that he had the requisite state of
mind at that time.”93 The defendant’s evidence about his or her mental ill-
ness is only relevant to the question of whether the defendant acted pur-
posely or knowingly. Whether the defendant was able to know what he or
she was doing was wrong or whether he or she could control his or her
conduct are irrelevant to the determination of guilt.
In addition, if the jury determines that the State has not carried its
burden on mental state, the jury must return a special verdict of not guilty
“for the reason that due to a mental disease or defect he could not have a
particular state of mind that is an essential element of the offense
charged.”94 If this occurs, the defendant is not released from custody.95 In-
stead, the criminal trial essentially becomes a civil proceeding and the judge
must determine whether the defendant—due to his or her mental illness—
presents a current danger to himself or herself or to others.96 If he or she is
dangerous, he or she is civilly committed to the State Mental Hospital for
treatment.97 If he or she is not dangerous, he or she is released from cus-
tody.98
The final point during which mental illness is considered is at sentenc-
ing.99 During disposition, the sentencing judge must determine whether,
due to a mental illness, the defendant was able to “appreciate the criminality
of his acts or to conform his conduct to the law at the time he committed the
offense for which he was convicted.”100 These are the same questions that
have been asked in Montana since at least 1899: whether the defendant had
a cognitive or volitional defect. The difference is that these questions are
now asked at sentencing and are answered by the judge, not the jury. The
judge’s determination that the defendant has either a cognitive or volitional
defect means the defendant is sent to the State Mental Hospital at Warm
Springs.101 A finding that the defendant could appreciate the criminality of
his or her conduct or could conform his or her conduct to the law means the
93. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996.
94. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–201(2) (1979).
95. Bender, supra n. 2, at 148. R
96. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–301; Bender, supra n. 2, at 148. R
97. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–301(2); Bender, supra n. 2, at 148. R
98. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–301(3); Bender, supra n. 2, at 148. R
99. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996.
100. Id.; see also Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–311.
101. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996–997; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–312(2).
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defendant will be sent to the State Prison, regardless of whether he or she
suffers from a mental illness.102
Significantly, while the Montana Legislature did not remove consider-
ation of mental illness from the proceedings, it did remove from the jury the
consideration of whether defendants understood their conduct or could con-
form that conduct to the law. While these were jury questions in Montana
prior to 1979, the Legislature made them purely questions for the judge.
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN NEUROSCIENCE SINCE ABOLITION
The 35 years since Montana’s abolition of the insanity defense have
seen dramatic development in the field of neuroscience and the creation of
the new interdisciplinary field of neurolaw.103 The recent explosion in
neuroscience is largely a result of the development of new technology, such
as fMRIs, PET scans, and CT scans.104 The power of this new technology is
that it allows scientists to study the brain of a living person and to study the
brain in action.105 Prior to this technology, scientists could only observe
brain abnormalities after an autopsy.106 Today, scientists are able to see the
brains of live people and, more importantly, scientists are able to observe
the brain while a person does something, either a physical or mental task.107
As a result, scientists have been able to identify which area or areas of the
brain are involved in making decisions, regulating emotions, and control-
ling impulses.108
Currently, scientific studies connecting genetic or brain abnormalities
and crime are correlative not causative.109 In other words, they show corre-
lations between certain conditions or brain abnormalities and antisocial be-
havior.110 Neuroscience has yet to be able to pinpoint causes for criminal
conduct. To date, no scientific study has causally linked a brain condition
with criminality. Due to the complexity and mutability of the brain, some
102. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–312(1).
103. Wikipedia, Neurolaw, http://perma.cc/3LAJ-5PS3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurolaw) (last
modified Mar. 27, 2015, 14:32). The term “neurolaw” was first used by Sherrod Taylor in 1991. See J.
Sherrod Taylor, J. Anderson Harp & Tyron Elliott, Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers, 5 Neurop-
sychology 293, 293–305 (1991).
104. Carrido, supra n. 63, at 321. R
105. Brain Initiative Report, supra n. 12. R
106. Gary W. Small et al., Current and Future Uses of Neuroimaging for Cognitively Impaired
Patients, 7 Lancet Neurology 161, 166 (2008).
107. See generally Wolfgang Taube et al., Brain Activity during Observation and Motor Imagery of
Different Balance Tasks: An fMRI Study, 64 Cortex 102 (2015).
108. Glenn & Raine, supra n. 10, at 56. R
109. See id.
110. See e.g. M. Brower & H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and
Criminal Behaviour: A Critical Review, 71 J. of Neurology, Neurosurgery, & Psych. 720, 720 (2001).
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scholars doubt that science will ever be able to fully explain the
brain–mind–action conundrum.111
Other scholars, however, are more optimistic about the ability of scien-
tists to understand how the brain and genetics work.112 The technology for
studying the brain is only decades old and continues to develop dramati-
cally.113 In addition, as the body of science, studies, and data grow, scien-
tists are able to be more rigorous and precise.114 Some studies and exper-
iences are starting to move closer to causality and some scientists anticipate
being able to definitively connect particular brain abnormalities and genetic
mutations with criminal conduct.115
A compelling demonstration of the power of neuroscience and its new
technologies—and a case which most closely demonstrates causality—is
that of Michael, a 40 year old teacher with no criminal history of any kind.
Happily married, Michael suddenly became aggressive toward his wife and
began collecting child pornography. After sexual contact with his pre-pu-
bescent stepdaughter, Michael was convicted of child molestation. Al-
though originally given a suspended sentence and ordered to complete a sex
offender treatment program, Michael was kicked out of the program after
propositioning the female staff. As a result, the sentencing court ordered
him to serve his suspended prison term. The night before he was to report to
prison, Michael went to the emergency room complaining of a severe head-
ache. While in the emergency room, Michael continued his antisocial and
uninhibited conduct, demanding sex from the nurses and urinating in his
pants with no apparent concern. A doctor ordered an MRI which revealed a
large tumor at the base of the orbitofrontal cortex. After doctors success-
fully removed the tumor, Michael’s behavior returned to normal: he was no
longer sexually inappropriate and had no desire for child pornography. Sev-
eral months later, Michael’s aggression and collection of child pornography
resumed. A second use of brain scan technology revealed that the tumor had
returned. After a second surgery to remove the new tumor, Michael’s be-
havior again returned to normal.116
Using brain scan technology, several different parts of the brain have
been identified in decision-making and regulation of behavior.
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with self-regulatory processes,
including attention and cognitive flexibility, and may be linked to the antiso-
cial feature of impulsivity and poor behavior control. The anterior cingulate is
involved in error processing, conflict monitoring, and avoidance learning. In-
111. Morse, supra n. 13, at 511–516. R
112. Adam J. Kolber, Will There be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 Ind. L.J. 807, 829–831 (2014).
113. Id. at 829.
114. Id. at 829–830.
115. Glenn & Raine, supra n. 10, at 54, 56. R
116. Id. at 57.
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dividuals with damage to this region are more disinhibited and aggressive and
demonstrate impairments in inhibitory control and emotion processing. The
ventral prefrontal cortex, including the orbitofrontal cortex, has received par-
ticular attention given its role in emotion processing, learning from reward
and punishment, and decision making.117
In addition to increased understanding of the brain, scientific under-
standing of genetics has also undergone exponential growth in the last sev-
eral decades. Fueled in part by the Human Genome Project, scientists are
isolating particular genes or genetic combinations connected to antisocial
behavior.118
Recently, scientists have begun linking brain abnormalities in the con-
trol centers of the brain to genetic mutations and finding strong correlations
between these abnormalities and compromised self-control and increased
criminal behavior.119 Specifically, studies of the MAOA gene, particularly
the mutation which produces a low functioning gene (MAOA-l), are show-
ing a strong connection between the presence of the genetic mutation and
criminality.120
The MAOA-l gene is linked to an overactive amygdala and impair-
ments in the control systems of emotions (through changes in the prefrontal
cortex) and cognitive processes (through changes in the cingulated gy-
rus).121 Results suggest that the MAOA-l allele, particularly in males, is
linked to changes in brain circuitry responsible for the regulation of emo-
tions, emotional memory, and cognitive control, all of which are related to
impulsivity and reactive aggression.122
There are multiple studies that demonstrate that the presence of the
MAOA-l genetic mutation, when combined with early childhood maltreat-
117. Id.
118. Steven I. Friedland, A Vision of the Future, http://perma.cc/H936-GTPU (http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/case/revolution/reimagining.html) (accessed Apr. 4, 2015) (excerpt from
Steven I. Friedland, The Criminal Law Implications of the Human Genome Project: Reimagining a
Genetically Orientated Criminal Justice System, 86 Ky. L.J. 303 (1997)). Interestingly, some of this
development has been fueled by the criminal justice system’s use of DNA evidence to convict or exon-
erate defendants. The search for definitive proof of identify in the criminal justice system helps propel
advances in scientific techniques in DNA analysis. In addition, the criminal justice system’s increased
collection and use of DNA increased the available DNA data which dramatically improved statistical
reliability of DNA results.
119. Matthew L. Baum, The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive
Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials? 6 Neuroethics 287 (2011).
120. Id. at 288.
121. Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg et al., Neural Mechanisms of Genetic Risk for Impulsivity and Vio-
lence in Humans, 103 Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 6269, 6270, 6273 (2006).
122. Joshua W. Buckholtz & Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg, MAOA and the Neurogenetic Architecture
of Human Aggression, 31 Trends in Neuroscience 120, 125 (2008); Essi Viding & Uta Frith, Genes for
Susceptibility to Violence Lurk in the Brain, 103 Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. 6085, 6085
(2006).
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ment, is a statistically significant risk factor for criminal behavior.123 In
fact, one study found that 85% of a group of MAOA-l individuals who had
been abused as children had committed crimes against persons by age
twenty-six.124 In addition, studies have found an 8% reduction in the sizes
of the amygdala, anterior cingulate, and orbitofrontal cortex in males with
the MAOA-l genetic variation.125 These studies suggest a causal pathway
from genes to brain to antisocial behavior.
Again, while these studies demonstrate a strong correlation between
the MAOA-l gene—combined with adverse childhood environments—and
criminality, scientists are not yet willing to assert that they have found a
cause for antisocial behavior. The strong correlation, however, is suggestive
of causation and has propelled additional research into both the MAOA-l
gene and the corresponding brain mechanisms. In addition, scientists con-
tinue to explore other possible genetic factors and brain mechanisms. Given
advances in technology, these studies will continue to be more refined, pro-
duce more precise results, and move the scientific community toward con-
sensus about the connection between genetic variations, brain abnormali-
ties, and criminal behavior.
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEUROSCIENCE
DEVELOPMENTS FOR MONTANA
In light of the developments in neuroscience, some scholars have
called for changes to either the insanity defense or the criminal justice sys-
tem’s treatment of psychopaths.126 Since Montana abolished the insanity
defense in 1979 and replaced it with a mens rea approach, it would appear
that these challenges are not relevant to Montana criminal trials. To date,
this has been true. There is not a single reported criminal case in Montana
in which brain scan technology was introduced. However, brain scan tech-
nology has been introduced in criminal trials in other states and at every
phase of the trial: competency, guilt, and sentencing.127 Given that Montana
allows for the consideration of mental disease or defect at each of these
123. Baum, supra n. 119, at 287; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, supra n. 122, at 125; David M. R
Fergusson, Joseph M. Boden & L. John Horwood, MAOA, Abuse Exposure and Antisocial Beha-
viour:30-Year Longitudinal Study, 198 British J. of Psychiatry 457, 457 (2011).
124. Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297
Sci. 851, 853 (2002); Corrado, supra n. 6, at 499. R
125. Meyer-Lindenberg, supra n. 121, at 6270. R
126. Corrado, supra n. 6, at 498; Carrido, supra n. 63, at 325–326. R
127. See e.g. Susan E. Rushing, The Admissibility of Brain Scans in Criminal Trials: The Case of
Positron Emission Tomography, 50 Ct. Rev. 62 (2014) (discussing admissibility of brain scans during
pretrial competency hearings, guilt phase, and sentencing); Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Court-
room Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 Int’l J. L. in Context 233, 237
(2006).
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stages, it is just a matter of time before Montana judges and juries are con-
fronted with images of brain abnormalities and asked to determine whether
the defendants’ abnormalities affected their ability to understand the crimi-
nality of their conduct, conform their conduct to the law, or form the correct
mental state.
The case of Michael and his tumor raises these issues in troubling
ways. First, does it seem just to hold Michael criminally responsible for his
conduct? Second, does it seem just to prevent the admission of brain scan
evidence of his tumor? Without the use of the brain scan, Michael’s tumor
would not have been discovered. Importantly, the tumor—a serious brain
abnormality—seemed to be “causing” Michael’s behavior. Interestingly,
Michael reported that he knew that his conduct was wrong, but he seemed
powerless to control his behavior. Without the tumor, Michael was able to
conform his behavior to the law. In this situation, it seems difficult to imag-
ine holding Michael criminally responsible for his behavior. Rather, it
seems possible to consider the tumor as the cause of his behavior. His tu-
mor was not the result of any action on his part. The presence of the tumor
in his brain appeared to have affected the portions of his brain that regulate
behavior.
In some ways, Michael’s case is easy. It is possible to make a clear
separation between him and the tumor. It is also plausible to identify the
tumor as a medical condition that caused his criminal behavior. When we
consider other brain abnormalities, especially those that arise from a genetic
mutation or variation, it seems harder to separate the actor from the condi-
tion causing the criminality. Therefore, it is important to assess how Mon-
tana’s approach would work in both Michael’s case and in the case of a
genetic mutation.
A. Michael’s case
Although Michael was convicted before his tumor was discovered, it is
interesting to examine how his case would be handled in Montana if the
tumor were discovered prior to trial. If Michael were to have committed his
conduct in Montana, it is likely he would have been charged with incest. In
relevant part, incest is when a person knowingly has sexual intercourse or
sexual contact with a child or stepchild.128 Because his stepdaughter was
under the age of 12 at the time of the offense, consent would be irrelevant
and, if convicted, Michael would serve a sentence of 100 years with a
mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years prior to being eligible for parole.
A judge may suspend the 25 year mandatory minimum in the event that the
judge determines, based on a sexual offender evaluation report, that a treat-
128. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–507 (2013).
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ment facility provides “a better opportunity for rehabilitation of the of-
fender and for the ultimate protection of the victim and society.”129
To prove the charge of incest, the prosecution would have to prove that
Michael acted with the correct mental state of “knowingly.” For incest, a
person acts knowingly when “the person is aware of the person’s own con-
duct.”130 Under Montana law, Michael would not be permitted to introduce
evidence of a mental disease or defect as a defense. However, Michael
would be permitted to introduce evidence of a mental disease or defect to
challenge the existence of his state of mind of “knowingly.” First, Michael
would have to establish the threshold issue that he had a mental disease or
defect. The legislature cast a wide net in its definition of “mental disease or
defect”: “an organic, mental, or emotional disorder that is manifested by a
substantial disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such
an extent that the person requires care, treatment, and rehabilitation.”131
The tumor would appear to fit this definition. It could be characterized as an
organic disorder that seriously interfered with his thinking and judgment
and required surgery to remove.
Having established that he suffered from a mental disease or defect,
Michael would be able to argue to the jury that—because of the tumor—he
was not able to act knowingly. His best case would be to put on evidence of
the tumor and how it resulted in changed behavior. His case would be
strengthened by brain scan images and expert testimony about the impact of
the tumor on his brain. Unfortunately for Michael, he stated that he was
aware of his conduct, knew that his conduct was wrong, but was unable to
control his conduct. As a result, the prosecution would have an easy time
establishing that Michael had the correct mental state. Most likely, there-
fore, Michael would be convicted—even with the tumor impacting his
brain.
While Michael would likely not be successful at trial in challenging
the presence of mental state, he would likely be able to successfully argue
at sentencing that, due to the tumor, he was “unable to appreciate the crimi-
nality of [his] behavior or to conform [his] behavior to the requirements of
law.”132 As a result, the mandatory sentence would not apply and Michael
would be committed to the Department of Public Health and Human Ser-
vices for custody and treatment.133 In Michael’s case, his treatment would
be the removal of the tumor. If, as happened in real life, removal of the
tumor resulted in Michael’s behavior returning to normal, then Michael
129. Id. at § 46–18–222.
130. Id. at § 45–2–101(35).
131. Id. at § 46–14–101.
132. Id. at § 46–14–311.
133. Id. at § 46–14–312.
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would be able to petition the court for a modification of his sentence based
on the fact that he no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect.134 The
sentencing judge could modify the sentence, but the legislature has deter-
mined that the “length of confinement or supervision must be equal to that
of the original sentence.”135 In other words, Michael would be sent to
prison for the remainder of his sentence.
While Michael’s case of a tumor affecting his behavior does not occur
with great frequency in the criminal justice system, other acquired brain
abnormalities are more common. For example, a significant number of vet-
erans have experienced traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) while serving in Iraq
or Afghanistan.136 In fact, the number of active military suffering from
TBIs has increased dramatically since 2000. Many of these veterans experi-
ence difficulty regulating their emotions, controlling their impulses, or con-
forming their conduct to the requirements of the law.137 According to the
Center for Disease Control, TBIs are a serious public health problem in the
United States.138 It is also a problem that shows up in the criminal courts
with increased frequency. In fact, many jurisdictions—including Montana
in 2011—have created veterans’ courts to attempt to address criminal con-
duct of veterans that stems from physical, mental, emotional, or psychologi-
cal abnormalities acquired during service.139
B. MAOA-1
Currently, one of the strongest demonstrated connections between
criminal conduct and brain abnormality is the MAOA-l plus an adverse
childhood experience or environment.140 Studies demonstrate that people
who have this genetic alteration have decreased impulse control and a
134. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–312(3)(a).
135. Id. at § 46–14–312(4).
136. Ctrs. for Disease Control et al., Report to Congress on Traumatic Brain Injury in the United
States: Understanding the Public Health Problem among Current and Former Military Personnel
(2013) (available at http://perma.cc/8FJC-BNML (http://www.nashia.org/pdf/report-to-congress-on-
traumatic-brain-injury-2013-a.pdf)).
137. Id.; Eric B. Elbogen et al., Criminal Justice Involvement, Trauma, and Negative Affect in Iraq
and Afghanistan War Era Veterans, 80 J. of Consulting and Clinical Psychol. 1097 (2012).
138. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Injury Prevention & Control: Traumatic Brain Injury,
Basic Information about Traumatic Brain Injury and Concussion, http://perma.cc/W6KT-L375 (http://
www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/basics.html) (updated Feb. 24, 2015) (“Each year, traumatic brain
injuries contribute to a substantial number of deaths and cases of permanent disability. In 2010, 2.5
million TBIs occurred either as an isolated injury or along with other injuries.”).
139. See e.g. Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., Veterans Courts: Resource Guide, http://perma.cc/SNV4-3LDD
(http://www.ncsc.org/topics/problem-solving-courts/veterans-court/resource-guide.aspx) (accessed Apr.
5, 2015). For more information on Montana’s Veterans Court see U.S. Dep’t of Vets. Affairs, VA Mon-
tana Health Care System, http://perma.cc/K3CG-56XS (http://www.montana.va.gov/MONTANA/fea-
tures/Montana_s_first_Veterans_court_launches_in_Missoula.asp) (updated July 18, 2014).
140. Baum, supra n. 119, at 304. R
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higher susceptibility to reactive violence.141 In other words, if confronted
with an emotional situation, the MAOA-l individual is less likely to be able
to control his or her emotions and more likely to react impulsively with
violence. In addition, the MAOA-l person experiences an increased likeli-
hood, and intensity, of aggressive reaction to provocation.142
Assuming that the MAOA-l person’s reactive violence was a punch
that caused a broken jaw, the State would likely charge an aggravated as-
sault. In this situation, aggravated assault is when a person purposely or
knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another.143 The result of a broken
jaw would constitute serious bodily injury144 and the prosecution would
have to prove that the MAOA-l person acted purposely or knowingly as to
that result. For this case, “purposely” would be defined as the defendant’s
conscious object to cause a broken jaw and “knowingly” as the awareness
of a high probability that a broken jaw would result from the conduct.145
The MAOA-l defendant might assert that he was not able to form the
correct mental state due to a mental disease or defect. Again, the threshold
matter is whether he suffered from a mental disease or defect, here a combi-
nation of early childhood trauma, a genetic mutation, and a resulting brain
abnormality. The MAOA-l defendant would seek to admit evidence of ge-
netic testing and brain scan imaging to establish that he has the low func-
tioning variant of the MAOA gene and that he has a corresponding decrease
in the size of the areas of the brain associated with impulse control. These
abnormalities could be characterized as “organic.”146 In addition, the result-
ing increase in negative emotional salience and corresponding deficit in im-
pulse control could be considered “a substantial disturbance in behavior,
feeling, thinking, or judgment.”147 Therefore, it is very possible that, based
141. Id.; Viding & Frith, supra n. 122, at 6085. R
142. Baum, supra n. 119, at 294. R
143. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–201 (“Assault: (1) A person commits the offense of assault if the
person: (a) purposely or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another; . . . (c) purposely or know-
ingly makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any individual; or (d) purposely or
knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another.”).
144. Id. at § 45–2–101(66) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that: (i) creates a substan-
tial risk of death; (ii) causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function or process of a bodily member or organ; or (iii) at the time of injury, can reasonably be ex-
pected to result in serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function or
process of a bodily member or organ.”).
145. Id. at § 45–2–101(65) (“‘Purposely’—a person acts purposely with respect to a result or to
conduct described by a statute defining an offense if it is the person’s conscious object to engage in that
conduct or to cause that result.”); Id. at § 45–2–101(35) (“‘Knowingly’—a person acts knowingly with
respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when the person is
aware of the person’s own conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect
to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware that it is
highly probable that the result will be caused by the person’s conduct.”).
146. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–101(2)(a).
147. Id.
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on expert testimony, an MAOA-l defendant would be able to establish that
he has a mental disease or defect. This would allow the defendant to present
to the jury evidence of a mental disease or defect in order to negate the
presence of the mental state.148
The MAOA-l defendant’s argument to the jury would be that he did
not act purposely or knowingly as to the result of serious bodily injury
because of his inability to control his emotions and reactive violence. His
argument could take two forms. One, he could argue he essentially over-
reacted to the situation and did not intend to cause as much harm as he did.
In other words, while the broken jaw was not within his conscious object or
awareness, he meant to strike the victim. This argument is not likely to
succeed because of the prosecution’s ability to have the jury instructed fol-
lowing Montana Code Annotated § 45–2–201(2)(b).149 This statute allows
the prosecution to prove the defendant’s mental state of purposely or know-
ingly causing a more serious result than anticipated if the defendant in-
tended to cause the same or similar type of harm, just to a lesser degree.
The second form of the argument negating mental state would be that
the MAOA-l defendant was unable to form any conscious object or have
any awareness due to an increased impulsivity and a lack of ability to con-
trol his conduct. Because a conscious object is generally thought to be a
reflected upon goal, accompanied by a plan to accomplish that goal, the
MAOA-l defendant might be able to argue that his impulsivity specifically
prevented him from being able to reflect, plan, or engage in goal-oriented
behavior. The argument to negate knowingly (being aware of a high
probability of a particular result) would be more difficult. It seems plausi-
ble, however, that a jury could accept the scientific evidence and find that
the prosecution was not able to carry its burden as to mental state.
Therefore, it is both possible and foreseeable that juries and judges
will face these decisions in the near future. It is also plausible that a jury
could reasonably accept or reject the mental disease or defect defense. If the
jury accepts the defense in a serious case like aggravated assault, the judge
must then determine whether the defendant suffers from a mental disease or
148. Id. at § 46–14–102 (“Evidence of mental disease or defect or developmental disability is admis-
sible to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense.”).
149. Id. at § 45–2–201 (“Causal relationship between conduct and result. (1) Conduct is the cause of
a result if: (a) without the conduct the result would not have occurred; and (b) any additional causal
requirements imposed by the specific statute defining the offense are satisfied. (2) If purposely or know-
ingly causing a result is an element of an offense and the result is not within the contemplation or
purpose of the offender, either element can nevertheless be established if: (a) the result differs from that
contemplated only in the respect that a different person or different property is affected or that the injury
or harm caused is less than contemplated; or (b) the result involves the same kind of harm or injury as
contemplated but the precise harm or injury was different or occurred in a different way, unless the
actual result is too remote or accidental to have a bearing on the offender’s liability or on the gravity of
the offense.”).
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defect that “renders the defendant a danger to the defendant or others.”150 If
the court determines that the defendant is dangerous, then “the defendant
may be committed to the custody of the director of the department of public
health and human services to be placed in an appropriate mental health
facility for custody, care, and treatment.”151 In essence, the criminal matter
is converted into a civil commitment process—with periodic review—in
which the prosecution has the burden to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant remains dangerous.152
If the jury rejects the defense of mental disease or defect and finds that
the defendant had the correct mental state, the judge still must consider
whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect that rendered him
unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his behavior
to the law.153 The inability, due to the increased impulsivity to conform his
behavior to the law, would be the strongest argument for the MAOA-l de-
fendant. Assuming he is successful, he would be given a criminal sentence
but committed to Warm Springs for treatment.
The challenge for the MAOA-l defendant is the availability of proven
treatment. Some of the proposed treatments include mindfulness training,
omega 3 supplements, and 5HT2a receptor antagonists.154 While there have
been tentative positive results from a variety of these treatments, scientific
consensus is still lacking on effective treatment options for MAOA-l
criminals.155 In the absence of an effective treatment program, the MAOA-l
convict continues to suffer from a mental disease or defect that prevents
him from controlling his behavior and Warm Springs is unable to treat the
person. The combination of inability to control behavior and increased like-
lihood of reactive violence means that the untreated MAOA-l person is dan-
gerous. The legislature contemplated this situation in Montana Code Anno-
tated § 46–14–312(3)(d) (2013). The State Mental Hospital has the oppor-
tunity to petition the sentencing court to transfer a patient to prison in the
event that:
(d) the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect that makes the de-
fendant a danger to the defendant or others, but:
(i) there is no treatment available for the mental disease or defect;
(ii) the defendant refuses to cooperate with treatment; or
(iii) the defendant will no longer benefit from active inpatient treatment
for the mental disease or defect.156
150. Id. at § 46–14–301(2)(a).
151. Id.
152. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–301(3).
153. Id. at § 46–14–311(1).
154. Baum, supra n. 119, at 300–301. R
155. Id. at 301.
156. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–312(3)(d) (emphasis added).
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If the sentencing court agrees with Warm Springs, then the MAOA-l indi-
vidual would be transferred to Deer Lodge for the length of the original
sentence.157
VIII. SPECULATIONS AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE
Importantly, the MAOA-l defendant is a person with a mental disease
that prevents him or her from conforming his or her behavior to the law. His
or her mental disease or defect stems from a combination of factors that are
both beyond the person’s ability to control: genetics and an adverse child-
hood environment. People have no choice or control over the genes they
inherit. Similarly, children do not have the ability to make different choices
about adverse childhood environments. These are choices made by other
people and inflicted upon the MAOA-l individual. The MAOA-l person,
however, will have been tried, convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated in the
same manner as a defendant with no mental disease or defect. By all ac-
counts, this is exactly what Representative Keedy envisioned in 1979 when
he proposed abolishing the insanity defense. As Representative Keedy
stated, “I think they are criminals and should be charged as such in our
courts.”158 To this end, the 1979 abolition has been largely successful and
will continue to be successful even in light of the latest neuroscience devel-
opments.
Representative Keedy’s accompanying objective in abolishing the in-
sanity defense was to remove psychiatrists from the criminal justice system
because they were making “arbitrary and godlike determinations” and their
findings were not “scientifically valid.”159 This objective has been less suc-
cessful than Representative Keedy had hoped.160 In addition, this objective
will become less and less possible in the future. Neuroscience developments
will become more relevant because of their “scientific validity.”161 Trials of
the mentally ill will once again be battles of experts and juries will be con-
fronted with extremely compelling and complex evidence concerning brain
abnormalities, brain anatomy, and genetics. By all accounts, neuroscientific
157. Id. at § 46–14–312(4).
158. Mont. H. Jud. Comm., supra n. 1, at 12. R
159. Id.
160. Steadman et al., supra n. 14, at 359 (“Clearly, after the reform substantially more defendants R
pleading insanity were convicted. Presumably that had been a main goal of the reform. At the same time,
more persons pleading insanity had their charges dismissed. . . . Moreover, no longer were persons who
were found incompetent to stand trial subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity. Instead, they,
too, had their charges dismissed and often were committed indefinitely to the state mental hospital’s
security unit.”).
161. Kolber, supra n. 112, at 829–831 (arguing that neuroscience will continue to develop and be- R
come more precise in its findings).
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evidence will more and more resemble “godlike” determinations about the
function of the human brain and its connection to criminal behavior.
Currently, many object to Montana’s approach to mental disease or
defect because they believe it violates basic precepts of morality underlying
the criminal justice system.162 Some commentators posit that these moral
concerns will be aggravated by advances in neuroscience that fundamen-
tally challenge the concept of free will and choice. As one commentator
stated: “To the extent that the justification for punishment is perceived to
rest on fundamental assumptions that appear increasingly untenable, the
moral legitimacy of the criminal law is undermined.”163
Regardless of the validity of these challenges, the 1979 abolition of the
insanity defense has been hugely successful from a different standpoint.
Every person suffering from a mental disease or defect who commits a
crime has created a victim whose personal autonomy and physical integrity
have been violated. From the victim’s perspective, it makes no difference if
the person who harmed him or her was mentally ill or completely sane. By
treating all defendants in a similar manner—regardless of the presence or
absence of a mental disease or defect—Montana has, since 1979, essentially
been adopting the victim’s perspective and emphasizing the issue of protec-
tion of society over questions about morality of punishment. This has essen-
tially been a public policy choice that values social control.
Perhaps neuroscience’s primary challenge to the current Montana leg-
islative scheme dealing with mental disease or defect will be that the State
will have to explicitly recognize these underlying public policy questions.
Neuroscience will force us to be clear—regardless of whether a person can
be said to have made a conscious choice to engage in criminal behavior or
not—about our decision as a society that we are going to punish him or her.
Regardless of whether a person can appreciate the criminality of his or her
conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law, we
are going to incarcerate certain individuals due to their dangerousness.
Once we move from a concept of free choice and individual responsi-
bility, we quickly cross into a territory of truly “arbitrary and godlike deter-
minations.” While this “dangerousness” territory has seemed far off in the
future, glimpses of that future are already here. Currently, the U.S. Supreme
Court has affirmed indefinite civil commitment for sex offenders based on
determinations of future dangerousness.164 The issue is not whether we
162. See e.g. Corrado, supra n. 6, at 493–494. R
163. Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in the Age of “Mind-Reading”, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1191, 1243 (2009).
164. Kan. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 (1997) (state law); U.S. v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126,
129–131 (2010) (federal law); see Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect
Science: Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 Temple L. Rev. 697, 703–704
26
Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol76/iss2/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-2\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 27  5-AUG-15 13:02
2015 ARBITRARY AND GODLIKE 307
agree or disagree with the perpetual commitment of sex offenders. Rather,
the question is how we determine dangerousness. In the past, dangerousness
has been synonymous with a choice to commit a criminal act. Perhaps the
largest challenge for the future lies in the neuroscience developments that
further weaken the notions of individual choice and responsibility and fur-
ther open the door to “dangerousness” considerations based on other fac-
tors, such as genetics or brain abnormalities.
In Montana, the 1979 abolition of the insanity defense allowed for the
incarceration of people who have mental diseases or defects. Currently, we
permit incarceration of the mentally ill who are untreatable and dangerous
to society. These public policy decisions about social control have been
largely confined to a very small segment of society and have not challenged
the larger criminal justice system as a whole. Developments in neuros-
cience, however, are not going to be so easily confined and have the poten-
tial to affect all of our decisions in the criminal justice system. The Mon-
tana 1979 abolition will bring these challenges to the fore more quickly
than in other states for two reasons. First, abolition opened the door to these
explicit social control considerations. Second, abolition made these consid-
erations relevant in almost all trials. By replacing the insanity defense with
a consideration of a mental disease or defect in the determination of the
existence of the requisite mental state, abolition made mental disease or
defect relevant in nearly all cases because the prosecution must establish the
defendant’s mental state in nearly all cases.165 While neuroscience develop-
ments are currently limited to acquired brain abnormalities and a small pop-
ulation subset with MAOA-l genetic abnormalities, neuroscience insights
will continue to develop and expand. As a result, they will play larger and
larger roles in more and more Montana criminal cases. Ultimately, the 1979
abolition of the insanity defense will force the state to explicitly address
dangerousness and social control issues for the entire criminal justice sys-
tem.
(2011); Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: Desert/Disease Jurisprudence, 48 San
Diego L. Rev. 1077, 1097 (2011).
165. Excluding the small number of strict or absolute liability crimes.
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